PYDANTIC max_length (38 Routen, ~400 Field-Constraints): Schützt vor DoS durch Riesen-Payloads (10MB Thread-Titel etc.). Pragmatische Limits: - Titel/Name: 200 · Beschreibung/Body: 10000 · Notiz: 5000 - Email: 254 (RFC 5321) · URL: 500 · Slug/Kategorie: 100 - Hund-Name/Rasse: 80 · Hund-Bio: 2000 Top-betroffen: forum.py, diary.py, health.py, dogs.py, expenses.py, notes.py, auth.py, profile.py. Manuelle len()-Checks in profile, chat, ki entfernt (jetzt durch Field abgedeckt). PYTEST COVERAGE (+19 Tests, 37 grün + 1 xfail): - test_security.py: require_owner (Places GET/PATCH/DELETE mit Fremduser → 403), JWT-Blacklist (Logout invalidiert Token), Login-Lockout (5 Fehlversuche → 429 + Retry-After Header) - test_race.py: Invoice-Counter (20 parallele Threads, alle unique), Founder-Number (atomare Vergabe, voll bei 100) - test_validation.py: Forum-Titel 30k Zeichen → 422, Diary-Text 50k → 422 (verifiziert Pydantic max_length-Sweep) A11Y (Tap-Targets ≥44×44 + Dark-Mode-Kontrast): - #header-user-btn 36→44px, .header-back 40→44, .header-menu-btn 40→44 - dog-profile Wrapped-Slider Prev/Next 40→44 - forum-Lightbox Close 40→44 - --c-text-muted Light: #B0A090 (2.37:1 FAIL) → #7F6B58 (4.74:1 PASS) - --c-text-muted Dark: #806A58 (3.58:1 FAIL) → #A08878 (5.46:1 PASS) - Branding-Farben unangetastet
315 lines
12 KiB
Python
315 lines
12 KiB
Python
"""Security-Tests: require_owner, JWT-Blacklist, Login-Lockout.
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Diese Tests verifizieren die in Sprint60 eingefuehrten Security-Helper
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und stellen sicher, dass z. B. eine versehentliche Aenderung an
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require_owner / blacklist_jti hier sofort einen roten Test ergibt.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import secrets
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import time
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import pytest
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Helper: zweiten frischen User registrieren (wie das `user`-Fixture)
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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def _make_other_user(client) -> dict:
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"""Registriert einen zweiten verifizierten User mit JWT-Token."""
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email = f"other-{secrets.token_hex(4)}@example.com"
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pw = "OtherPass123!"
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name = f"other{secrets.token_hex(3)}"
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r = client.post("/api/auth/register", json={
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"email": email, "password": pw, "name": name
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})
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assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
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from database import db
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with db() as conn:
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conn.execute("UPDATE users SET email_verified=1 WHERE email=?", (email,))
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r2 = client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": pw})
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assert r2.status_code == 200, r2.text
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token = r2.json()["token"]
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return {
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"email": email,
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"password": pw,
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"name": name,
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"token": token,
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"headers": {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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}
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# ==================================================================
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# 1) Owner-Check via require_owner — Places
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# ==================================================================
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class TestRequireOwnerPlaces:
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"""places.py nutzt `require_owner` fuer PATCH/DELETE — wir testen
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den vollen Lebenszyklus mit zwei verschiedenen Usern."""
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def _create_place(self, client, user) -> dict:
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r = client.post(
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"/api/places",
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headers=user["headers"],
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json={
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"name": "Test-Cafe",
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"typ": "restaurant",
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"lat": 49.5,
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"lon": 11.0,
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"hund_rein": True,
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},
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)
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assert r.status_code == 201, r.text
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return r.json()
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def test_get_place_is_public(self, client, user):
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"""places sind public — fremder User darf lesen."""
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place = self._create_place(client, user)
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other = _make_other_user(client)
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r = client.get(f"/api/places/{place['id']}", headers=other["headers"])
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assert r.status_code == 200
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assert r.json()["id"] == place["id"]
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def test_patch_place_other_user_is_forbidden(self, client, user):
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"""PATCH mit fremdem User -> 403 (require_owner greift)."""
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place = self._create_place(client, user)
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other = _make_other_user(client)
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r = client.patch(
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f"/api/places/{place['id']}",
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headers=other["headers"],
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json={"name": "Hijacked"},
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)
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assert r.status_code == 403, r.text
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# Owner kann immer noch patchen
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r2 = client.patch(
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f"/api/places/{place['id']}",
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headers=user["headers"],
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json={"name": "Cafe Updated"},
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)
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assert r2.status_code == 200
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assert r2.json()["name"] == "Cafe Updated"
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def test_delete_place_other_user_is_forbidden(self, client, user):
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"""DELETE mit fremdem User -> 403."""
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place = self._create_place(client, user)
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other = _make_other_user(client)
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r = client.delete(f"/api/places/{place['id']}", headers=other["headers"])
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assert r.status_code == 403, r.text
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# Owner kann loeschen
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r2 = client.delete(f"/api/places/{place['id']}", headers=user["headers"])
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assert r2.status_code == 204
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def test_patch_nonexistent_place_is_404(self, client, user):
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"""require_owner wirft 404 wenn row None ist."""
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r = client.patch(
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"/api/places/9999999",
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headers=user["headers"],
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json={"name": "Ghost"},
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)
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assert r.status_code == 404
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# ==================================================================
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# 2) JWT-Blacklist — Logout invalidiert Token serverseitig
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# ==================================================================
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class TestJwtBlacklist:
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def test_logout_blacklists_bearer_token(self, client):
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"""Nach Logout muss das gleiche Token bei /auth/me 401 ergeben."""
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# Frischer User in diesem Test — nicht das `user`-Fixture verwenden,
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# weil andere Tests es weiter brauchen koennten.
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info = _make_other_user(client)
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# 1) Token funktioniert
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r = client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=info["headers"])
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assert r.status_code == 200
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# 2) Logout
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r2 = client.post("/api/auth/logout", headers=info["headers"])
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assert r2.status_code == 200
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assert r2.json()["ok"] is True
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# 3) Token nun blacklisted -> 401
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r3 = client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=info["headers"])
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assert r3.status_code == 401, (
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f"Token wurde nach Logout NICHT blacklisted (status={r3.status_code})"
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)
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def test_blacklist_entry_persisted_in_db(self, client):
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"""Pruefen, dass das jti tatsaechlich in jwt_blacklist landet."""
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info = _make_other_user(client)
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# jti aus Token extrahieren
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import jwt as _jwt
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payload = _jwt.decode(
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info["token"], options={"verify_signature": False}
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)
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jti = payload.get("jti")
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assert jti, "Token enthaelt kein jti"
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# Logout
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client.post("/api/auth/logout", headers=info["headers"])
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from database import db
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with db() as conn:
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row = conn.execute(
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"SELECT jti, expires_at FROM jwt_blacklist WHERE jti=?", (jti,)
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).fetchone()
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assert row is not None, "jwt_blacklist-Eintrag fehlt nach Logout"
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assert row["jti"] == jti
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# ==================================================================
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# 3) Login-Lockout — 5 Fehlversuche -> 429 mit Retry-After
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# ==================================================================
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class TestLoginLockout:
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"""In conftest.py wird der Lockout fuer die Test-Session global
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deaktiviert (sonst wuerden Auth-Tests sich gegenseitig blocken).
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Hier aktivieren wir ihn fuer einzelne Tests gezielt zurueck."""
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def _enable_lockout(self, monkeypatch):
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"""Aktiviert die Lockout-Logik fuer einen einzelnen Test wieder.
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In conftest.py werden routes.auth._db_is_account_locked und
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_db_record_login_failure global gestubbt (damit Register-Spam
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durch andere Tests nicht zur Session-weiten Sperre fuehrt).
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Hier definieren wir die echten Implementierungen lokal neu
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(Kopie aus routes/auth.py) und setzen sie per monkeypatch
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zurueck — das wird nach dem Test automatisch revertiert.
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"""
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import routes.auth as _ra
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from database import db
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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# Counter leeren — sonst beeinflussen vorherige Tests die Sperre.
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with db() as conn:
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conn.execute("DELETE FROM login_attempts")
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_LOCKOUT_WINDOW_MIN = 15
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_LOCKOUT_ATTEMPTS_MAX = 5
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def _is_locked(email: str):
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with db() as conn:
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row = conn.execute(
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"SELECT locked_until FROM login_attempts WHERE email=? COLLATE NOCASE",
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(email,)
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).fetchone()
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if not row or not row["locked_until"]:
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return None
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try:
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locked_until = datetime.fromisoformat(row["locked_until"])
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except Exception:
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return None
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now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
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if locked_until.tzinfo is None:
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locked_until = locked_until.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
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if locked_until <= now:
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return None
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return int((locked_until - now).total_seconds())
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def _record(email: str):
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now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
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window_start = now - timedelta(minutes=_LOCKOUT_WINDOW_MIN)
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with db() as conn:
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row = conn.execute(
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"SELECT attempts, last_attempt FROM login_attempts WHERE email=? COLLATE NOCASE",
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(email,)
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).fetchone()
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if row:
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try:
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last = datetime.fromisoformat(row["last_attempt"])
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if last.tzinfo is None:
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last = last.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
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except Exception:
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last = now
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attempts = (row["attempts"] + 1) if last >= window_start else 1
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else:
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attempts = 1
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locked_until = None
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if attempts >= _LOCKOUT_ATTEMPTS_MAX:
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locked_until = (now + timedelta(minutes=_LOCKOUT_WINDOW_MIN)).isoformat()
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conn.execute(
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"""INSERT INTO login_attempts (email, attempts, last_attempt, locked_until)
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VALUES (?,?,?,?)
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ON CONFLICT(email) DO UPDATE SET
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attempts=excluded.attempts,
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last_attempt=excluded.last_attempt,
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locked_until=excluded.locked_until""",
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(email.lower(), attempts, now.isoformat(), locked_until)
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)
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monkeypatch.setattr(_ra, "_db_is_account_locked", _is_locked)
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monkeypatch.setattr(_ra, "_db_record_login_failure", _record)
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def test_lockout_after_five_failed_logins(self, client, monkeypatch):
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"""5x falsches PW -> 6. Versuch ergibt 429 mit Retry-After."""
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# Eigenen User anlegen, damit andere Tests das Lockout-Limit nicht
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# zufaellig schon erreicht haben.
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info = _make_other_user(client)
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self._enable_lockout(monkeypatch)
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# 5 Fehlversuche
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for i in range(5):
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r = client.post("/api/auth/login", json={
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"email": info["email"], "password": "WRONG-PW!"
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})
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assert r.status_code == 401, (
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f"Versuch {i+1}: erwartete 401, bekam {r.status_code}"
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)
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# 6. Versuch: jetzt gelockt
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r6 = client.post("/api/auth/login", json={
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"email": info["email"], "password": "WRONG-PW!"
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})
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assert r6.status_code == 429, (
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f"Erwartete 429 nach 5 Fehlversuchen, bekam {r6.status_code}"
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)
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assert "Retry-After" in r6.headers, "Retry-After-Header fehlt bei Lockout"
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def test_lockout_writes_to_login_attempts_table(self, client, monkeypatch):
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"""login_attempts-Eintrag muss locked_until enthalten."""
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info = _make_other_user(client)
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self._enable_lockout(monkeypatch)
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for _ in range(5):
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client.post("/api/auth/login", json={
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"email": info["email"], "password": "WRONG-PW!"
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})
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from database import db
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with db() as conn:
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row = conn.execute(
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"SELECT attempts, locked_until FROM login_attempts WHERE email=? COLLATE NOCASE",
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(info["email"],)
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).fetchone()
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assert row is not None, "Kein login_attempts-Eintrag angelegt"
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assert row["attempts"] >= 5
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assert row["locked_until"] is not None, "locked_until nicht gesetzt"
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# ==================================================================
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# 4) Rate-Limit auf /auth/login (Brute-Force-Schutz auf IP-Ebene)
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# ==================================================================
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@pytest.mark.xfail(
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reason="rl_check ist in conftest fuer alle Tests gestubbt — Rate-Limit "
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"laesst sich pro Test nicht selektiv reaktivieren ohne andere "
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"parallele Tests zu beeintraechtigen."
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)
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def test_login_rate_limit_blocks_burst(client):
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"""20+ schnelle Logins -> 429 vom Rate-Limiter."""
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info = _make_other_user(client)
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statuses = []
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for _ in range(25):
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r = client.post("/api/auth/login", json={
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"email": info["email"], "password": "WRONG-PW!"
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})
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statuses.append(r.status_code)
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assert 429 in statuses, f"Kein Rate-Limit-Treffer in {statuses}"
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